The Enforceability of Antenuptial Agreements for the Religious Instruction of Children by Carty, James E.
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ANTENUPTIAL AGREE-
MENTS FOR THE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION
OF CHILDREN
JAMES E. CARTY*
The antenuptial agreement for the religious instruction
of children generally appears in mixed marriages contracted
between Protestant and Catholic parties. The Roman Cath-
olic Church requires that the non-Catholic party sign such
an agreement before its consent will be given to the pro-
posed union. The enforceability of this type of agreement
would seem to be of interest in view of the increasing num-.
ber of mixed marriages.' There appears, however, to have
been little litigation regarding such agreements. The ques-
tion of the enforceability of the agreement may arise (1)
indirectly where a party seeks custody without referring
to the agreement, and (2) directly where the agreement is
sought to be enforced irrespective of who has custody.
The American and English and Empire cases will be con-
sidered separately. The American cases are in conflict as
to the enforceability of antenuptial agreements for the re-
ligious education of children, while the English doctrine is
that the agreement lacks legal significance and is not en-
forceable. As the English and Empire cases antedate the
American cases, the former will be considered first in the
following order, based on differences in fact situations: (1)
cases where both parties to the agreement were dead and
the dispute was between the maternal and paternal rela-
tives; (2) cases where one party to the agreement was dead
and the other alive, and the dispute was between the latter
party and the relatives of the deceased; and, (3) cases where
the parties to the agreement were both alive and involved
in the litigation. The varying fact situations may not have
affected the results, but the cases are considered on this
* 3rd year law student Duke University; A.B. Washington State Col.
lege 1949.
1 THOMAS, some Observations* on Mixed Marriages in the United
states, (Inst. of Social Studies, St. Louis Univ. 1951).
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basis for purposes of convenience and because there may
be different considerations present.
The development of the English doctrine occurred between
1852 and 1878.2 In re Brown3 appears to have been the basis
for the English cases. The court found there was no ante-
nuptial agreement but, nevertheless, laid down the "prac-
tical argument" against enforcement. The court doubted
its ability to enforce an agreement of this type wondering if
the family would have to be broken up to prevent violation
of the agreement and difficulty was forseen in attempting
to force a father to furnish funds for the education of his
child in a religion with whose principles he was in dis-
agreement. The court could not see itself lodging a father
in jail for life unless he consented to his child being brought
up in a faith he believed unscriptural and destructive of the
child's eternal welfare and for not furnishing the funds for
that purpose.4
The argument does not appear to be sound. A court is
generally able to compel a husband to contribute support
money when it confronts him with the alternative of im-
prisonment. The court may have had in mind the desir-
ability of this method of enforcement. As to the possibility
of enforcement breaking up a home, this in all probability
happened prior to institution of litigation. The court seems
to have underestimated both its talents and ability.
Cases Where Both Parties to the Agreement Were Dead
In re UrenzP involved litigation between the maternal and
paternal relatives after the death of the parents. It was
said that while the agreement was not enforceable weight
would be given it, apparently as being indicative of the in-
tent of the parties. The Protestant father had indicated a
desire to abide by the agreement. The public authorities
were given custody of the children, but it was ordered that
2 For an extended analysis of the English cases see: WHITE, THE
LEGAL EFFECT OF ANTENUPTIAL PROMISES IN MIXED MARRIAGES (1932).
2 Ir.Ch.R. 151 (1852).
See In re Agar-Ellis, 10 Ch.D. 60 (1878).
(1936) Q.S.R. 168, 10 AusT.L.J. 363 (1936-1937). The antenuptial
agreement was between a Protestant man and a Catholic woman.
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they be educated as Catholics. The court said that the wel-
fare of the children was to be given great consideration.
In the recent case of In re Collins,6 the child had been
placed in the care of the Protestant maternal grandparents.
Some two years later, the paternal grandparents sought cus-
tody so that they would be able to raise the child a Catholic.
In the lower court, Chitty, J., construed the agreement as
not being between the parties but between the parties and
the Catholic Church. The agreement was said to be un-
enforceable. On appeal, it was held that under the Guard-
ianship of Infants Act of 1925, the welfare of the child was
the controlling factor. The maternal grandparents were
given custody. Lindley, L. J., said he did not know whether
the agreement was a contract between the parties but
thought "it rather looks like a condition imposed by a higher
power." The result was probably sound as the child had
been with the Protestant parties sufficiently long to have
become inculcated with Protestant beliefs. It may have been
best for the child's welfare to avoid the possible shock
which might have attended a change of religion.
Cases Where One Party to the Agreement Was Dead
The earliest -case involving this fact situation seems to
have been Hill v. Hill.7  The Catholic father died, and the
paternal relatives sought to control the religious education
of the daughter. The existence of an agreement was not
proved, but the court said that if an agreement had been
found, there appeared to be no "principle on which the court
could not give effect to it."
One of the leading English cases is Andrews v. Salt.8 The
Catholic father died when the daughter in question was
nearly a' year' old. The father by will named his brother
[1950) 1 All E.R. 1057. The antenuptial agreement was between a
Protestant woman and a Catholic man. The father predeceased the
mother.
7 40 L.J.Rep. 505 (31 N.S.) (1861). The alleged antenuptial agreement
was between a Catholic man and a Protestant woman; it was provided
that boys be educated as Catholics and girls as Protestants.
8 L.R. 8Ch. 622 (1873). A Catholic man and a Protestant woman
entered into an oraz antenuptial agreement that the boys were to be
educated as Catholics and the girls as Protestants.
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testamentary guardian and directed that his children be
raised as Catholics. After a lapse of nine years, the brother
instituted proceedings to enforce the father's direction. In
the meantime, the child had been raised as a Protestant in
accordance with the agreement. In the lower court, Malins,
V. C., said that if such an agreement were established, it
would be one to which the court would feel inclined to give
effect.9 On appeal, it was said that such an agreement was
not legally binding and that the child is ordinarily to be
raised in the religion of the father, but the right of the
father could be waived, and in determining whether a waiver
had occurred, the agreement was a circumstance to which
weight should be attached. The decision was based on the
facts that the father had allowed the child to be baptized a
Protestant and the laches of the guardian in seeking en-
forcement of the father's direction.'0
A similar situation existed in In re Clark."' The Protest-
ant father abided by the agreement during his life, but after
his death, the paternal relatives sought to have the child
raised as a Protestant. The antenuptial agreement was
held unenforceable, but the court said if, after the father's
death, it appeared to be best for the child's welfare that it
be educated in the mother's religion and there was a ques-
tion as to whether the father had waived his rights, an
antenuptial agreement would be given great weight. It
was decreed that the Catholic instruction be continued on
the grounds that (1) the father had waived his rights and
9 L.R. 8Ch. 628 (1873).
10 Accord, In re Meades, 5 Ir.R.Eq. 98 (1871), involving an antenuptial
agreement between a Protestant man and a Catholic woman; the mother
died. A maternal aunt petitioned for custody and asked that the father
be restrained from interfering with the Catholic upbringing of the
children. The court refused to enforce the agreement on the ground
that the father was supreme in matters relating to his children. The
court said, "The authority of a father to guide and govern the education
of his child is a very sacred thing, bestowed by the Almighty, and to
be sustained to the uttermost by human law." Cited in L.R. 10 Ch. 57
(1878).
- 21 Ch.D. 817 (1882). A Protestant man and a Catholic woman
signed an antenuptial agreement to the effect that any issue of the
marriage would be raised as Catholics.
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(2) it was in the best interest of the child that it be brought
up as a Catholic. 19
Cases Where Both Parties to the Agreement Were Living
The Protestant father in In re Agar-Ellis's instituted pro-
ceedings to have the children made wards of the court and
to have the question of their religious education settled. In
the lower court, Malins, V. C., said the wishes of the father
were to control unless: (1) he proposed to raise the children
as infidels; (2) there was immoral conduct involved; or, (3)
the father had been guilty of abandonment of the parental
duty. The Vice-Chancellor said that an antenuptial agree-
ment for religious instruction of children was not enforce-
able.14 The decision granting the father control of the re-
ligious education of the children was affirmed largely on the
ground of the father's supremacy in such matters.s5
In Rochfort v. Rochfort,16 the parents were engaged in
litigation for custody of a child of the marriage. A statute
1 Accord, O'Donnell v. O'Donnell, 1918, pt.2 Scots L.T. 233. The
parents were both Catholics. The mother died, and the father married
a Protestant.woman. An antenuptial agreement was signed. The father
died. There were no children by the second marriage. The Catholic
relatives sought custody to ensure that the children were raised Cath-
olics. It was said that "prima facie, it is in the best interests of a child
that he should be educated in the religion of his parents, or, If there
be a difference between the religion of the father and that of the mother,
in the religion of the father." The agreement was referred to in order
to show the desires of the father in the matter, and though it was not
expressly said whether the agreement was enforceable, the clear impli-
cation of the opinion is that such was the court's view. But the court
said that the controlling consideration should be the welfare of the
children.
13 Supra, n. 4. The agreement was between a Protestant man and a
Catholic woman with any children of the marriage to be raised as
Catholics. The Ohio court in In re Loucks, 10 Ohio S.&C.P.Dec. (1889),
said that the English courts had gone to the edge of reasoning in sus-
taining the supremacy of the father in the religious instruction of the
children, citing the present case.
24 Apparently Malins had undergone a remarkable metamorphosis
after his decision in Andrews v. Salt, supra, n. 8, where he could see no
reason for non-enforcement. Some five years elapsed between that case
and the present decision.
Accord In re Meades, 5 Ir.R.Eq. 98 (1871).
:1 (1944) 61 W.N. (N.S.W.) 125, 18 AusT.L.J. 145 (1944-1945). A
Catholic man and a Protestant woman executed an antenuptial agree-
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provided that in such cases, the welfare of the child was to
control. Apparently, the father's only interest in the child
was that it be raised in his religion. The court was mainly
concerned with the welfare of the child and said that the
desire of the father for a particular religious upbringing
did not equal the desirability of committing the child to the
custody of the mother. The antenuptial agreement was said
to be of no effect.
It would seem that different policy considerations might
be present in the different fact situations outlined above.
In the cases where both parties were alive, the court might
feel more inclined towards enforcement, inasmuch as the
one spouse had probably entered into the marital relation-
ship relying on the promise of the other spouse to raise
the children in a particular faith.17 Much the same consid-
erations could apply in cases where one of the parties was
dead, if the deceased spouse were the one making the promise
to educate the child in a particular manner. Where the
promising party is the one surviving or where both parents
are dead, a further question arises, namely, who would have
standing to enforce the agreement.1 s A conflict between
local law and canon law could arise as the latter obligates
the baptismal God-parent to intervene on the death of a
Catholic parent to ensure a Catholic home for the child.19
Where the promising spouse is the survivor, sound policy
might induce the court to refuse to enforce the agreement.
If it were to be held enforceable, a situation might well arise
where the survivor, having married one of his own faith,
would have his children attending different churches. Such
ment providing that any issue of the union were to be raised Catholics.
In addition, the woman signed a subsequent agreement prior to separa-
tion promising that the children would be raised as Catholics.
'1 Agruably, the situation would be more persuasive to the court where
one party to the marriage was a devout Catholic, for that Church im-
poses the penalty of excommunication on the members thereof who
violate the laws of the Church which are especially strict with respect
to marriages with non-Catholic parties. 'Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d
100 (1942).
18 Brewer v. Cary, 14S Mo.App. 193, 127 S.W. 685 (1910) where that
was the ground of decision.
10 This was exactly the situation in Brewer v. Cary, supra, n. 18.
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a situation would present great practical difficulties, and it
might be sound policy to hold the agreement unenforceable
in that case.
The English rule, then, is that an antenuptial agreement
for the religious instruction of children is not enforceable.20
It appears there are valid reasons why the English rule
would be of doubtful applicability as precedent in American
courts. The rule received its impetus from the 1852 case of
In re Browne. At that time, and for some years subsequent
thereto, factors prevailed different from those obtaining
today: (1) the father was deemed to be the supreme author-
ity in family affairs. 21 But today in England this is changed
by the Guardianship of Infants Act of 1925 and similar
statutes. Like legislation has been enacted in the United
States.22 It would seem that this reason for the rule against
enforceability would be of little importance today. (2) Hos-
tility to Catholicism was prevalent at the time the early cases
were decided. But this has decreased in recent years.23
Today, the climate would be more favorable to holding an
agreement enforceable. (3) The idea that enforcement
would lead to broken homes was relied on in support of the
^0 In addition to the above cited cases, there are other English cases
which have been cited for the proposition, but their authority is doubt-
ful. See, Stourton v. Stourton, 8 De G.M.&G. 760, 44 Eng. Rep. 583
(1857) where the parents were both Catholics at the time of the mar-
riage, and there was no antenuptial agreement; D'Alton v. D'Alton,
4 P.D. 87 (1878) involved an agreement made after marriage and In
consideration of the wife's reconciliation with an adulterous husband;
Hawksworth v. Hawksworth, L.R. 6 Ch. 539 (1871) Involved a mixed
marriage, but there did not appear to have been an agreement-the
child was ordered to be raised in the religion of the Catholic father;
In re Nevin, [1891] 2 Ch. 299 where the court relying on Andrews v.
Salt, did not bother to decide whether there was a contract or not be-
fore holding it unenforceable.
E.g. In re Agar-Ellis, supra, n. 13. In re Browne, supra, n. 3.
- In re Carroll, [1931] 1 K.B. 317. "In most American states, stat-
utes have been passed giving parents equal powers, rights and duties
in regard to their children." Note, Validity of an Antenuptial Contract
Concerning the Religious Instruction of Children, 28 VA.L.REv. 1131
(1942).
FRIEDMAN, PARENTAL RIGHT TO CONTROL THE RELIGIOUS EDUOATIOIN
OF A CHILD, 29 HAR.L.R. 485 (1915-1916).
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rule. 2 4 The fears of the court were more imaginary than
real in this connection. It is difficult to conceive of a situa-
tion where home life has remained tranquil until the time
of the suit. It would seem that the opposite would be true-
that the home would be badly disrupted before the parties
felt compelled to resort to litigation. It appears, therefore,
that this reason for the rule was not valid in the first in-
stance. (4) The professed inability of the court to see how
the decree could be enforced was also urged in support of
the rule. 5 It is difficult to imagine why a court should have
more difficulty in enforcing an agreement of this type than
any other agreement. One might suspect that the courts
were studiously underestimating their ability.
In view of these considerations, it is difficult to see how,
in the light of present conditions, the English cases could
serve as useful precedent for an American decision. In
addition, the older cases would appear to be no longer appli-
cable in England in view of changed circumstances. No mat-
ter what view one takes of the results in the English cases,
the reasoning therein may well be deemed to have been
faulty.
The American decisions are not in accord as to the legal
significance of an antenuptial contract for the religious in-
struction of children. The reports are relatively free of
cases on the subject. This may be due to two reasons, the
latter probably being the more important: (1) the compro-
mise of religious differences by way of an antenuptial agree-
ment permanently settles the question to the satisfaction of
the parties; or (2) enforcement might not be sought in case
of a disagreement because of a belief that the agreement
lacks legal significance, especially in view of the English
decisions. The American cases will be considered in two
groups: (1) the cases holding antenuptial agreements for
the religious instruction of children unenforceable; and (2)
the cases holding such agreements to be enforceable.
21 See supra, n. 20.
See supra, n. 20.
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The Cases Holding Antenuptial Agreements for the Reli-
gious Instruction of Children To Be Unenforceable
Both parties to the agreement were dead in In re Turn-
er.25 The Protestant father had predeceased the mother.
The paternal and maternal grandparents both applied for
guardianship. Under state law, the father had power to
dispose of the guardianship of his children by will but had
not done so. In searching for evidence of the father's intent
in the matter, the court considered the agreement and said,
"The father . . . has expressed no wish . . . I
cannot regard his promise to the priest at his mar-
riage, as expressing a wish; the circumstances un-
der which it was exacted, would by no means allow
it to be considered as the expression of his desire
or conviction. The fact that he consented to its
baptism in the Roman Church, is of more weight,
and yet cannot be regarded as the expression of a
desire . . ."
The view that the promise was to the priest is interesting.
It was held that the father who knew the views of the
mother had expressed no desire, and it could be inferred
from this that he desired the wishes of the mother to con-
trol. It was said that the wishes of the mother might not
be followed "if it clearly appeared that the interest of the
infant required her wishes to be disregarded." The maternal
grandparents were awarded custody.
In Brewer v. Cary27 after'the death of the mother, the
maternal grandfather who was God-father to one of the
children brought a bill in equity against the Protestant
father who was raising the children as Protestants in vio-
lation of the agreement. The petition was that the court
order the children to be brought up as Catholics. The case
was decided on the father's demurrer that the court lacked
jurisdiction, for under state law, the grandfather did not
19 N.J.Eq. 433 (1868). The agreement was between a Protestant
man and a Catholic woman with the children to be raised as Catholics.
The will of the mother directed that the children be raised as Catholics,
and she named her parents guardians.
7 Supra, n. 18. An agreement between a Protestant man and a Cath-
olic woman.
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have standing to maintain the action. This was the sole
point involved in the decision, but in passing, the court con-
sidered the legal significance of the agreement. 28 The court
quoted with approval a text statement that "permanent
transfer of the natural rights of a parent" was against pub-
lic policy, and the agreement was said to be unenforceable
at law or equity. It was said that if it were deemed an en-
forceable contract, the law might regard it as entered into
by the mother for the benefit of the children and enforce-
able in a suit by the children in affirmance of their right.
Assuming an enforceable right had been conferred on the
wife, the court did not feel that it would be a property
right passing to and enforceable by the executor or admin-
istrator of the deceased vife.29
The Cases Holding Antenuptial Agreements for the Reli-
gious Instruction of Children To Be Enforceable
In re Loucks 9 involved a situation where the parties to
the agreement were dead. After the children had been
away from the Catholic Church for several years, the Cath-
olic relatives instituted proceedings to have -the children
raised as Catholics in accordance with the agreement. It
"Andrews v. Salt, supra n. 8; In re Agar-Ellis, supra n. 4; and In re
Nevin, [1891] 2 Ch. 299 were relied on by the court after it had pre-
viously noted that "'Justice Talfourd's Act' (2 & 3 Vict. c. 54)" had
practically overturned the rule of the father's supremacy in family
matters. It will be noted that this old rule had a great deal to do with
the results in the cited cases.
2 In re Butcher's Guardianship, 266 Penn. 479, 109 A. 683 (1920).
The antenuptial agreement was between a Protestant man and a Cath-
olic woman. The mother predeceased the father who, before his death,
had expressed a desire that the children be raised as Catholics. The
Protestant grandfather was awarded custody. This was upheld. The
statute provided that in the appointment of guardians, persons of the
same religious persuasion as the parents were to be preferred. The
court said the father's "wish" did not bring him within the meaning
of the term "persuasion" and that anyhow the statute was not manda-
tory as the word "preferred" had been used therein and it was not a
mandatory word. The court did not pass on the enforceability of the
agreement.
01 10 Ohio S.&C.P. Dec. 1 (1889). The case involved an antenuptial
agreement between a Protestant man and a Catholic woman. The mo-
ther died. After indicating intent to disregard the agreement, the
father died.
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was said to be best for the children to leave them as they
were and that the agreement did not work as an estoppel
among the relatives. The laches of the Catholic parties
had a great deal of effect in determining the result of the
case. The court, however, discussed the legal effect of the
agreement saying it was based on high and sacred consid-
eration and that its binding force and inviolability would be
recognized by all courts and sanctioned by the moral sense
of mankind. If the litigation were between the parties to
the agreement, the court, by way of dictum, said it would
fail in its duty if it did not make the agreement work an
estoppel of the right of the father to change the course of
religious instruction provided for therein.31
In Denton v. James,32 an antenuptial agreement for the
religious instruction of children was said to be a "commend-
able compromise." Though clearly implying that had the
litigation been between the parties to the contract it would
have been held enforceable, the court said that on the death
of the Catholic mother "the father's right to educate his
child became paramount, and the agreement was merely
persuasive upon him."33
3 See, Commonwealth v. McClelland, 70 Penn.Super. 273 (1918). The
court had before it an antenuptial agreement between a Protestant man
and a Catholic woman. The father died. The mother was insane. The
children had been in the custody of a Protestant party for some years
and had acquired a marked anti-Catholic attitude. A maternal aunt
instituted proceedings looking toward the Catholic education of the
children in accordance with the agreement. The lower court denied the
request and by way of dictum said the children could have been brought
up as Catholics early in life and that had "the father., . raised any
objection ... his stipulation entered into at the time of the marriage
would have been a sufficient answer." The appellate court adopted the
lower court decision in a short per curiam opinion.
= 107 Kan. 729, 193 P. 307 (1920). The usual antenuptial agreement
was involved. The Catholic mother died. Custody was divided between
the maternal and paternal grandmothers. While she had custody, the
paternal grandmother adopted the child. The Catholic maternal grand-
mother instituted the proceedings to attack the regularity of the adop-
tion.
3 The prevalence of dictum in this branch of the law is very evident.
The court in In re Lamb's Estate, 139 N.Y.S. 685 (1912) cited the Eng-
lish rule that this type of agreement was not enforceable and said that
the "conclusion . . .does not appeal to me. Of course, such a rule could
not be the law of this state." An antenuptial agreement for the religious
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Ramon v. Ramon34 is the leading decision holding an ante-
nuptial contract for the religious education of children en-
forceable. The agreement was between a Protestant woman
and a Catholic man. The parties had separated, and the
wife had instituted an action for support. As a defense, the
husband relied on breach of the agreement. After litigation
had started, the parties entered into an agreement whereby
the child was to be placed in a Catholic boarding school with
the father paying the expenses. This gave effect ta the
antenuptial agreement. The court approved the arrange-
ment.35
It was said that recognition by American courts of the
right of a Catholic party to a marriage as a matter of sound
public policy to determine the religion of any issue of the
instruction of children was not involved. The remarks were dictum.
In Denton v. James, supra, n. 32 the implication that the agreement
would be enforced in an action between the parties thereto was not
necessary to the decision. Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N.Y. 294, 183
N.E. 429 (1932) did not involve an antenuptial agreement, but it was
stated that such agreement had in general been held valid. The court
cited 12 A.L.R. 1146, 29 Har.L.R. 485 and Denton v. James, supra, n. 32,
the latter citation (and quite arguably the A.L.R. citation) constituting
a compounding of dictum on dictum.
r4 Supra, n. 17. The court said (page 104) that, "The antenuptial
agreement . . .contemplated the preservation of the spiritual rights
and status of the respondent and those of his prospective children.
These rights though spiritual and intangible became for all purposes
just as real, protective and enforceable as pertained to any physical
property ... [The father] had the legal, equitable and constitutional
right to protect, to preserve and to maintain inviolate his membership
in the Roman Catholic Church. He had the undoubted right to enter
into any agreement which would insure to him the continued enjoyment
of its privileges and its protection . . .He had the right to determine
that in his married life he would continue as formerly to abide by its
rules, obligations and discipline. He had the right to seek to preserve
this advantage for his children. . . . He had the right to choose for a
spouse one who, though not Catholic, would at least agree not to inter-
fere in the exercise by him of his solemn religious duties, the most im-
portant of which would be to see that his children were brought up in
the Catholic faith .... [Italics by the court.]
Marriage was said to be a natural right, not created by law but
existing before all law. The rights arising out of the marriage relation-
ship were denominated "rights of personality." The reciprocal duties of
husband and wife were said to constitute property. Citing Jaynes v.
Jaynes, 39 Hun.(N.Y.) 40 (1886). For the same view see, Shearer v.
Shearer, 73 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1947).
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marriage whether or not there is an antenuptial contract
might have arisen from the recognition of three "funda-
mental principles": (1) such antenuptial agreements are
exclusively a Catholic rule; (2) the Catholic Church is the
only Christian church holding marriage indissoluble and a
sacrament; and, (3) under the natural law, procreation of
children being the object of marriage, the permanency of
the marital relationship is the foundation of the social order.
The- agreement was said to be founded on and rooted in the
canon law, a system of jurisprudence antedating the com-
mon law.8
In the opinion, great stress was given the fact that the
Catholic Church imposes severe penalties on its members
who do not do their uttermost to educate their children in
accordance with its doctrines. The court may have felt that
one marrying a Catholic would be aware of this pressure
and, therefore, should be bound by the agreement.
The court laid down what it considered to be rules of law:
(1) an antenuptial agreement is an enforceable contract hav-
ing a valid consideration; (2) the court will take notice of
the religious and moral obligationsof the parties thereto;
- (3) the spiritual training of a child' among members -of its
own faith is paramount over material considerations; (4)
holding' that'the religious training of a child can be dis-
pensed with until it reaches maturity .on the theory that it
can then choose what religion it desires is repugnant to
American background and traditions; (5) a court is bound
to uphold the demand. of a Catholic parent that a child of
the marriage be brought up in the Catholic faith;37 (6) the
court will take notice that the Catholic Church is the only
" It is difficult to see what relation these "fundamental principles"
have to a legal analysis of the problem. As to the statement regarding
the canon law, while it is interesting, and perhaps true, it had little to
do with the solution of the problem. The American system of law Is
not based on the canon law. After considering the concept of con-
sortium, the court said that upon the marriage of the parties, the agree-
ment became an inseparable part thereof.
7Apparently, the court meant that the demand of the Catholic
parents would be upheld even in the absence of an antenuptial agree-
ment.
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church binding its members to its laws under the penalty of
excommunication; and (7) the fact that the child is for a
time trained in violation of the contract does not invalidate
the contract.38
The most recent American case appears to be Shearer v.
Shearer.39 The agreement was said to involve more than in-
ternal affairs of the home and to the father, the matter was
not only one of sliritual welfare but one of strong public
policy. The court said that while the welfare of the child
was the controlling consideration,40 its welfare would not
be adversely affected by enforcement of the agreement since
the child had not reached the age where religious instruction
would have had any effect on it. The antenuptial agreement
was said to have been an inducing cause of the marriage
and an enforceable contract which should be upheld, every-
thing else being equal. The father was given the right to
take the children to church for religious instruction when
they became four years old.
It might be argued that Ramon and Shearer are of little
force even in the New York courts, for they are lower court
decisions. But in view of the fact that there has been
dictum in the New York appellate courts to the effect that
such agreements are enforceable4' and that for approxi-
mately forty years the lower courts have said such agree-
ments were enforceable, 42 there would seem to be adequate
basis for a contention that the settled New York rule is that
antenuptial agreements for the religious instruction of chil-
dren are of legal significance.
2' Evidently, this was intended to include the type of cases where
other courts had held that violation of the agreement coupled with
indoctrination of the child in principles of religions other than that
agreed upon resulted in a situation where to enforce the agreement
would be to endanger the child's welfare.
0 ,Supra, n. 35. The agreement was between a Protestant woman and
a Catholic man. A child was born. The mother brought an action for
separation and maintenance.
(0 This could be construed as somewhat of a retreat from the militant
view of the Ramon case.
42 Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N.Y. 294, 183 N.E. 429 (1932).
42 In re Lamb's Estate, 139 N.Y.S. 685 (1912).
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Conclusion
From a nose count of the American cases, it would appear
that the weight of authority is that an antenuptial agree-
ment for the religious instruction of children is a legally
enforceable contract. It might be argued, however, that
ordinary contract principles are not applicable to this type
of agreement as it is not an ordinary commercial contract
but one dealing with spiritual matters which calls for a dif-
ferent analysis and treatment. But from the ordinary con-
tract standpoint, a court would have little difficulty in find-
ing the necessary promises, be they expressed or implied.
It is well settled that marriage or a promise thereof is suf-
ficient consideration to support a contract.43 Constitutional
objections to enforcement seem to be absent.44
The question of enforceability boils down to one of policy.
This aspect of the problem should be considered on the
assumption that other factors are equal and that a decision
one way or another as to enforceability of the agreement
will not adversely affect the welfare of the child, for if the
child's welfare is endangered, that should be the paramount
consideration rather than some technical legal right of the
parent.45 It might be argued that this "welfare of the child"
13 It is not necessary to cite cases on this point as their numbers
are legion.
" U.S. CONST. AMEND. I provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." Whether this is picked up and applied to the states by
AMEND. XIV would appear to be immaterial as no law is being made.
If it were argued that some provision of AMEND. XIV §1 Is being violated
as to the child, the answer might well be that "Liberty of conscience
is a fundamental right. . . . But this pertains only to those who have
reached majority or mature judgment." In re Jacquet, 40 Misc. 575, 82
N.Y.S. 986 (1903). The Ramon case expresses a similar view. To a
protesting parent contending that he or she was being deprived of
religious freedom, in some way or other, it could be said that such
parent was cognizant of the provisions of the agreement when It was
signed. Such parent was, as a prospective spouse, faced with the altern-
ative of abstinence from the particular marital relationship or of enter-
ing into an agreement relating thereto. The latter alternative was
chosen. On what constitutional grounds should the party be heard to
complain?
Hernandez v. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522, 39 So. 641 (1905). By now, It
will have been noted that in the majority of the cases, the welfare of
the child has been held to be the matter of first concern.
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rule makes an agreement useless, but this is not necessarily
so, e.g., where the child is raised in accordance with the
agreement until suit is brought. If the child has not been
raised as provided in the agreement, the rights arising there-
under would probably be considered waived. Where the
child is raised in the specified faith until termination of
the marriage or the death of a party thereto and thereafter
the child is brought up in violation of the agreement for a
period of time, it would probably be held that a party seek-
ing to enforce the agreement after such a lapse of time
would be barred by laches. In both of the latter situations,
the agreement could be held unenforceable without resort
to the welfare of the child rule, and it would seem that the
rule would only be applicable in those situations.
It may be urged that it is against sound public policy for
a court to assist in the perpetuation of religious views from
one generation to the next.46 This ignores the fact that no
matter what the decision is, the court in effect is perpetuat-
ing the religion of one of the parties. To hold the agreement
unenforceable would, in a negative way, be to perpetuate
the religious view of the promising spouse from one genera-
tion to another. The court might be said to "be in a box,"
for whichever way it turns, it is favoring one religion or
another. This policy argument appears to be of doubtful
value.
It has been said that "public policy is against the perma-
nent transfer of the natural rights of a parent."47 Assuming
that a parent has some "natural rights" and further that the
religious instruction of children is such a right, why is public
policy against its permanent transfer? The logical result
is that in a mixed marriage there would be two competing
"natural rights"-the right of each parent to have the child
brought up in his or her particular religion. Unless some
adjustment is made between these "rights" conflicts may
arise. Public policy seems to favor peaceful adjustment of
possible sources of conflict. The antenuptial agreement
would appear to be such an adjustment or compromise, and,
16 State v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569, 162 S.W. 119 (1913).
17 Cited with approval in Brewer v. Cary, supra, n. 18.
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therefore, it should be favored by public policy. Again, the
policy argument appears weak.
Perhaps the strongest policy argument against enforce-
ment of the agreement is the alleged difficulty attendant
upon judicial intervention in the family relation. Courts
feel that it is not their duty to direct upbringing of chil-
dren4s or to oversee the thinking of parents. 49 A court can-
not regulate the internal affairs of the home."0 Obligations,
rights and duties which are moral in nature are not proper
subjects of equitable relief.51 Endless difficulties would
arise should courts attempt to tell parents how to bring up
their children.52 Injunctive relief in family relations only
result in making ridiculous the court granting the decree.53
This policy argument may be challenged on the ground that
when enforcement of the agreement is sought, there is no
longer a family relation. The parties have usually separat-
ed. 54 A disagreement is brought before the court. The issue
should be faced up to and settled in one way or another.
Cantankerous parents with a problem which cannot be set-
tled by the judiciary would present an interesting and un-
usual problem. A court would seem as well qualified to
decide the point of disagreement as would anyone else.
Two methods of enforcement might be through the doc-
trine of promissory estoppels5 or by invoking the aid of the
ecclesiastical courts. The latter alternative would be of
Is Application of Goldfarb, 6 N.J.Super. 543 70 A.2d 94 (1949); Noll
v. Noll, 277 App.Div. 286,,98 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1950).
Application of Goldfarb, 6 N.J.Super. 543, 70 A.2d 94 (1949).
Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 2 NE.2d 660 (1936).
Bartholemew v. Workman, 197 Okla. 267, 169 P.2d 1012 (1946).
Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936).
Bauman v. Bauman, 250 N.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 819 (1929).
5, See the Ramon, supra n. 17, and Shearer, supra, n. 35 cases. None
of the7 cases, English or American, involved, at least from the reported
facts, the situation contemplated when the courts see difficulty-an
existing family unit. The cases indicate that the parties had separated
and had been in difficulties for some time before the question of en-
forcing the agreement arose.
1 .. .. promises which often seem to have been intended as gratui-
tous have been enforced when a marriage has taken place In reliance
upon them." WILLSTON, CONTRAoTS, 500 (1936 ed.). See, p. 4939, n. 3
where it is said that antenuptial agreements for the religious Instruc-
tion of children are generally upheld In this country.
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value in a jurisdiction holding the agreement to be unen-
forceable. It may be summarized as follows: (1) member-
ship in a church carries with it submission to the organiza-
tion's ecclesiastical jurisdiction which is primarily contract-
ual in nature; 56 (2) an ecclesiastical court has jurisdiction
as to matters of faith, creed or discipline;57 (3) a decision of
an ecclesiastical court in a matter of which it has jurisdic-
tion is final and will not be reviewed by the civil courts ;'s
and, (4) the aid of the civil courts may be invoked to secure
enforcement of or to enjoin interference with an ecclesias-
tical decree. 9
It is arguable that an antenuptial agreement for the reli-
gious instruction of children would fall within the above
pattern. The main hurdle would be in finding contractual
submission to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. This might
be surmounted if signing the agreement were deemed to con-
stitute an implied submission to the ecclesiastical jurisdic-
tion of the church in matters of faith, creed or doctrine
arising therefrom. There is authority for the proposition
that the agreement raises matters of faith.60 It would seem
that once a decree favorable to enforcement was obtained
from the ecclesiastical courts, recourse could be had to the
civil courts for enforcement thereof or for a decree of non-
interference therewith.6 While a civil court might not
accept this method of enforcement, a practitioner confronted
with a local rule that the agreement is without legal signifi-
cance might be wise to attempt it.62
Ramsey v. Hicks, 174 Ind. 428, 91 N.E. 344 (1910); White Lick v.
White Lick, 89 Ind. 136 (1883); Thomas v. Lewis, 224 Ky. 307, 6 S.W.2d
255 (1928); Bear v. Heasley, 98 Mich. 279, 57 N.W. 270 (1893); Trustees
v. Halvorsen, 42 Minn. 503, 44 N.W. 663 (1890).
07 Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (U.S. 1871). In addition there are
numerous state decisions on the point.
See, supra, n. 57.
W 73 SoLJ. 440 (1929). See, Dwenger v. Geary, 113 Ind. 106, 14 N.E.
903 (1888).
00 In re Jacquet, 40 Misc. 575, 82 N.Y.S. 986 (1903); Ramon v. Ramon,
supra, n. 17.
c "It Is perhaps not generally understood that the Ecclesiastical
Courts are obliged to rely for the enforcement of their judgments ('ad-
monitions') upon the arm of the civil power. 73 SOL.J. 440 (1929).
e For the forms to be used in the Catholic courts, see, 6 JURIST 68
(1946).
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In conclusion, it may be said that the antenuptial agree-
ment itself lacks some of the trappings of an enforceable
contract. 3 The Protestant party promises "on my word
and honor." On the face of it, the agreement could be said
to be one to which the parties themselves attached no legal
significance. It just is not contract language. In addition,
the promise seems to run to no one in particular. * It would
appear that if the agreement is to be recognized as being
legally enforceable, a thorough revision thereof is neces-
sary.64
1 The present agreement is in two parts. In the first, the Catholic
party promises to continue his or her religion and to work for the con.
version of the other party. The agreement signed by the non-Catholic
party reads:
"I, the undersigned, wishing to contract a marriage with the above
mentioned Catholic, propose to do so with the understanding that the
marriage bond thus contracted Is indissoluble, except by death. And I
promise, on my word and honor, to fulfill the conditions required by
the Catholic Church in granting a dispensation, namely:
1. That the marriage ceremony will be performed by a Catholic priest
and that no other marriage ceremony will either precede or follow that
by the Catholic priest.
2. That the said [Catholic Party] .shall not be
hindered in any way in the free exercise of his/her religious duties.
3. That all the children of either sex born of this marriage shall be bap-
tized and educated in the Catholic Faith and according to the teachings
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61 A revision of the part signed by the non-Catholic party along the
following lines might be helpful, and it might be well to have It on a
separate page from that signed by the Catholic party.
"I, the undersigned, wishing to contract a marriage with the afore-
mentioned Catholic party, propose to do so with the understanding that
the marriage bond thus contracted is indissoluble, except by death. In
consideration of the said Catholic party entering Into the marital rela-
tionship with me, I hereby promise the said Catholic party to fulfill the
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conditions prescribed by the Catholic Church in granting a dispensation
for the marriage; in addition, in consideration of its granting the said
dispensation, I hereby promise the said Catholic Church to fulfill the
conditions prescribed by the said Catholic Church in granting the said
dispensation for marriage, namely: . .. (See the conditions in the orig-
inal agreement in n. 63.) ... In further consideration of the said
Catholic party entering into the marital relationship with me; and in
further consideration of the said Catholic Church granting a dispensa-
tion for the said marriage, I further promise the said Catholic party
and the said Catholic Church that should any disagreement occur re-
garding the religious instruction of any children which may be born of
the said marriage, such disagreement shall be submitted to the Ecclesi-
astical Courts of the said Catholic Church for determination and/or
decision, and I further promise and agree to accept the determination
and/or decision of the said Courts and be final and binding upon me.
I hereby acknowledge that it is my intention that the promises con-
tained herein be legally binding and enforceable in the secular courts
at the suit of the said Catholic party or the suit of any or all baptismal
God-parents of any or all of the children: which may or shall be born
to the said marriage."
[non-Catholic party] . .
The instrument could be concluded by appropriate formalities attendant
on signature. It is submitted that this would surmount the objections
that the language is non-contractual, the promise runs to no-one in par-
ticular, the parties did not intend a legal contract, and that the non-
Catholic party has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the church.
Such a form would seem to bind the promising party to submit a dis-
pute to the ecclesiastical courts-an arbitration agreement as it were.
The denomination of the promising party as well as the information as
to the priest could be well omitted in order that any religious tinge be
minimized.
